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Abstract
The subject of this article is Modal-Epistemic Arithmetic, a theory introduced by Horsten
to interpret Epistemic Arithmetic, which in turn was introduced by Shapiro to interpret
Heyting Arithmetic. I will show how to interpret Modal-Epistemic Arithmetic in Epistemic
Arithmetic and I will show how to get rid of a particular Platonist assumption. Then I will
discuss models for Modal-Epistemic Arithmetic in light of the problems of logical omniscience
and logical competence. Awareness models, impossible worlds models and syntactical models
have been introduced to deal with the first problem. Certain conditions on the accessibility
relations are needed to deal with the second problem. I go on to argue that those models
are subject to the problem of quantifying in, for which I will provide a solution.
1 Introduction
In this article I will describe and discuss Modal-Epistemic Arithmetic. In the first section I will
present Shapiro’s Epistemic Arithmetic, which was introduced to give a classical interpretation
of Heyting Arithmetic. I will explain why its classical models are either inadequate or result in
arithmetical omniscience and why it is preferable to analyse Shapiro’s notion of knowability as
a complex notion.
In the second section I will describe and discuss Horsten’s Modal-Epistemic Arithmetic, which
was introduced to interpret Epistemic Arithmetic and to show that analysing the complex notion
of knowability into an epistemic and a modal component yields a philosophical pay-off. I will
show that Modal-Epistemic Arithmetic can be interpreted in Epistemic Arithmetic as well.
In the third and final section I turn to the problem of finding adequate models for Modal-
Epistemic Arithmetic and, indirectly, for Epistemic Arithmetic. This problem will be approached
by discussing: first, Modal-Epistemic Sentential Logic (MESL); second, Modal-Epistemic First-
Order Logic (MEFOL); third, the extension of the latter with identity, individual constants and
function symbols; fourth and finally, Modal-Epistemic Arithmetic (MEA). A modal-epistemic
logic is confronted with the related problems of logical and arithmetical omniscience on the one
hand and the problem of logical incompetence on the other hand. Different types of models have
been proposed to solve the first kind of problem, viz. awareness models, impossible worlds models
and syntactical models. Horsten’s models for MEA are of the syntactical variety and as such they
can be used to solve the problem of logical omniscience. Moreover, his models provide a solution
to the problem of logical competence as well. It will be shown how to implement the same type
of solution to awareness models and impossible worlds models. A modal-epistemic first-order
logic is confronted with the problem of quantifying in, a problem shared by syntactical models,
awareness models and impossible worlds models. I will introduce a solution to this problem.
After briefly discussing identity and complex terms, I will critically discuss Horsten’s models and
provide an alternative based on the previous discussions.
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2 Shapiro’s Epistemic Arithmetic
In the first subsection I will briefly describe Shapiro’s Epistemic Arithmetic. In the second
subsection I will explain the difficulty of finding adequate but non-trivial models for his theory.
2.1 Theory
The language of Peano Arithmetic (LPA) contains the individual constant 0, the one-place
function symbol s, the two-place function symbols +, ·, and the two-place relation symbol <
(Boolos, Burgess, and Jeffrey 2003, p. 103). The set of well-formed terms and the set of well-
formed formulas are given their usual recursive definitions. The axiomatic theory of PA is
described in (Boolos, Burgess, and Jeffrey 2003, p. 208).
The language of Epistemic Arithmetic EA, denoted LEA, is LPA ∪ {K}. The definition of
the set of well-formed formulas contains one additional clause: if ψ is a well-formed formula,
then so is Kψ. The theory EA contains PA and, in addition, the following axiom schemes and
rule:1
E1 K (φ→ ψ)→ (Kφ→ Kψ)
E2 Kφ→ φ
E3 Kφ→ KKφ
E4 `EA φ ⇒ `EA Kφ
The theory EA is the closure of PA and the above axiom schemes and rule under classical
first-order logic with identity.
The philosophical relevance of EA depends partly on the fact that there is a faithful transla-
tion from the language of Heyting Arithmetic (HA) to EA which mimicks the so-called ‘Brouwer-
Heyting-Kolmogorov’-interpretation of HA ((Shapiro 1985), (Goodman 1984), (Flagg and Fried-
man 1986)). See (Smoryn´ski 1991) and (Horsten 1998) for a philosophical discussion.
2.2 Models for Epistemic Arithmetic
The classical model theory for epistemic logic was developed by Hintikka.2 A Kripke model M
for epistemic sentential logic is a triple 〈W,R, V 〉, with W a non-empty set, whose elements will
be called ‘possible worlds’, R a binary relation on W , which will be called ‘accessibility relation’,
and V a function from W and the set of sentence letters to truth values. The notion of truth of
a formula φ at a world w in a Kripke model M (M, w |= φ) is defined recursively as follows: if
φ is a proposition letter p, then M, w |= φ if and only if V (p, w) = 1; the truth clauses for the
negations and conjunctions are as expected; if φ is a well-formed formula of the form Kψ, then
M, w |= φ if and only if M, w′ |= ψ for all w′ such that wRw′. The axiom scheme E1 is valid
and the rule E4 is validity-preserving. If R is reflexive and transitive, then E2 and E3 are also
valid. Soundness and completeness can be proved for the epistemic sentential logical fragment
of EA.
The simplest Kripke-style model for epistemic first-order logic without identity is a quadruple
〈W,R,D, V 〉, with W and R as before and with D a non-empty set and V a function from the
set of n-place predicate symbols and W to ℘ (Dn) (Hughes and Cresswell 1996, ch. 13). An
1In (Shapiro 1985) the logical fragment of EA is presented as a natural deduction system. However, in (Horsten
1994) the logical fragment of Modal-Epistemic Arithmetic (MEA) is presented as an axiomatic system. In order
to facilitate comparisons, I will choose one proof-style, viz. the Hilbert style of proof theories.
2See (Hughes and Cresswell 1996) for a textbook presentation.
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assignment function a is a function from individual variables to elements of D. An x-alternative
of a, written as a′ ∼x a, is an assignment exactly like a except for the fact that it possibly
assigns a different element to x. The notion of satisfaction at a world w in a model M given
an assignment a (M, w, a |=) is similar to the notion defined before, butM, w(′) |= is uniformly
replaced by M, w(′), a. The clause for atomic well-formed formulas is replaced by: if φ is of the
form P (x1, . . . , xn) (with P an n-place predicate symbol from the language), then M, w, a |= φ
if and only if 〈a (x1) , . . . , a (xn)〉 ∈ V (P,w). Moreover, the following clause is added: if φ is of
the form ∀xψ, then M, w, a |= φ if and only if M, w, a′ |= ψ for all a′ ∼x a. Soundness and
completeness can be proved for the epistemic first-order logical fragment of EA. One can also
introduce individual constants, function terms and the identity relation (Hughes and Cresswell
1996, ch. 17).
It was argued in (Shapiro 1985, p. 23) that, if one uses Kripke-models for EA, then either
those models are inadequate or one gets arithmetical omniscience. Let ψ be an arithmetical
formula that is neither knowable to be true nor knowable to be false at w. It follows that there
must be an accessible possible world w′ where ψ is false and an accessible possible world w′′
where ψ is true. Either ψ or ¬ψ is true in the standard model of arithmetic (Boolos, Burgess,
and Jeffrey 2003, p. 104). If ψ is true in the standard model, then it cannot be the case that
ψ gets a standard interpretation at w′. But according to Shapiro that means that w′ is not a
real epistemic alternative. Mathematicians who do not know whether ψ are not uncertain about
the interpretation of ψ but about the truth of ψ. In other words, if one cannot model lack of
knowledge of arithmetical formulas as they are standardly interpreted, then the interpretation
is inadequate. Of course, one could stipulate that the arithmetical vocabulary gets a standard
interpretation at every possible world. But then all arithmetical truths will be true at every
possible world and, hence, all arithmetical truths will be knowable. If one were to drop the
assumption that there is an arithmetical formula such that it and its negation are unknowable
and if one accepts that knowability is factive, then one arrives once again at the conclusion that
all arithmetical truths are knowable. One can then prove for all φ ∈ LEA, all possible worlds w,
and all assignments a that M, w, a |= φ if and only if M, w′, a |= φ. It follows for all φ ∈ LEA,
all possible worlds w, and all assignments a that M, w, a |= φ if and only if M, w, a |= φ. In
other words, the models become trivial. To sum up, the interpretation is either inadequate or
trivial.
The notion of knowability is a primitive notion in the language LEA. Yet it is clear that it is,
in effect, a complex notion: it has a modal component, viz. the possibility of having knowledge,
and it has an epistemic component, viz. having knowledge. It would be better to analyse the
concept of knowability into those two components, so as to be able to distinguish and compare
modality and knowledge and to study their interaction. We will see that this is philosophically
fruitful.
In the next section I will describe and discuss Modal-Epistemic Arithmetic (MEA), a theory
developed to investigate the interaction between modality and knowledge. The language of
EA can be faithfully translated into the language of MEA. In section 4, I will discuss the non-
triviality and adequacy of the models of MEA. Given non-trivial and adequate models of MEA,
the latter can be used to give a non-trivial and adequate interpretation of the language of EA.
3 Horsten’s Modal-Epistemic Arithmetic: Theory
Horsten developed MEA in (Horsten 1993) and (Horsten 1994). The language of MEA is
LPA ∪{♦,P}, where LPA is as before the language of arithmetic, ♦ is a metaphysical possibility
operator and P is the informal proof or knowledge operator. The theory MEA consists of
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classical first-order logic with identity, PA, the modal system S5 and the following axiom schemes
and rule:3
ME1 ♦φ→ φ for all φ ∈ LPA
ME2 Pφ→ φ
ME3 Pφ→ PPφ
ME4 ` φ ⇒ ` ♦Pφ
ME5 ♦P (φ→ ψ)→ (♦Pφ→ ♦Pψ)
This concludes the description of the proof theory of MEA.4
There is a natural and faithful translation of the language of EA into the language of MEA.
Definition 1. Let F be a translation from LEA to LMEA as follows:
1. if φ is an atomic formula, then φF = φ;
2. if φ is ¬ψ, then φF = ¬ψF ;
3. if φ is ψ → θ, then φF = (ψF → θF );
4. if φ = ∃xψ, then φF = ∃xψF ;
5. if φ is Kψ, then φF = ♦PψF .
The above translation is natural, since the K-operator was interpreted as a knowability
operator. It was noted that the notion of knowability has an epistemic component and a modal
component. The F -translation makes those two components visible. The diamond operator is
interpreted as a possibility operator and the P-operator is interpreted as a knowledge operator.
Moreover, the F -translation is faithful, which will be proved in what follows. The following
lemmas can be found in (Horsten 1993, ch. 4) and (Horsten 1994, p. 286-287).
Lemma 1 (Horsten). For all φ ∈ LEA, `MEA ♦φF → φF
Proof. The proof is by induction on φF . The atomic case can be proved with the help of ME1.
The negation case follows from the induction hypothesis and the modal axiom schemes T and
5. The conjunction case follows from the induction hypothesis and the modal axiom scheme
K. The case of φ = ∀xψF follows from the induction hypothesis and quantified K. The case of
φ = ♦PψF follows from the modal axiom scheme 4.
Lemma 2 (Horsten). For all φ ∈ LEA, `MEA (φ→ φ)F , i.e. `MEA ♦PφF → φF
Proof. The lemma follows from axiom scheme ME2, modal axiom scheme K, and lemma 1.
Lemma 3 (Horsten). For all φ ∈ LMEA, `MEA ♦Pφ→ ♦P♦Pφ
Proof. Pφ → PPφ is an axiom scheme. By a derived rule of modal system K, it follows that
♦Pφ → ♦PPφ. It is a theorem of modal system T that Pφ → ♦Pφ. By ME4 and ME5, it
follows that ♦PPφ → ♦P♦Pφ. The lemma follows from the introduction rule for conjunction
and hypothetical syllogism.
3There is some discussion about the adequacy of S5 as a logic of metaphysical possibility – see (Williamson
2008).
4Horsten added the Barcan formula to the formulas, but that formula is derivable in S5 together with the
classical quantifier principles (Hughes and Cresswell 1996, p. 247).
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Corollary 1. For all φ ∈ LEA, `MEA (φ→ φ)F , i.e.
♦PφF → ♦P♦PφF
The above lemmas are used in the proof of the following theorem:
Theorem 1 (Horsten). For all φ ∈ LEA, if `EA φ, then `MEA φF .
Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of proofs in EA. MEA contains classical first-
order logic with identity and PA as well, so those cases are trivial. In the case of E1 one can use
ME5. In the case of E2 one can use lemma 2. In the case of E3 one can use lemma 1. Finally,
in the case of E4 one can use ME4.
Horsten did not prove the converse of the above theorem, but he conjectured it was correct.
I will prove his conjecture in what follows. One needs the following definition:
Definition 2. G : LMEA → LEA, defined as follows:
1. if φ is an atomic formula, then φG = φ;
2. if φ = ¬ψ, then φG = ¬ψG;
3. if φ = ψ ∧ θ, then φG = ψG ∧ θG;
4. if φ = ∀xψ, then φG = ∀xψG;
5. if φ = ♦ψ, φG = ψG;
6. if φ = Pψ, φG = KψG.
One can then prove the following two lemmas:
Lemma 4. For all φ ∈ LEA,
(
φF
)G
= φ.
Proof. By induction on the complexity of φ. Suppose that φ is atomic. Then φF = φG =
φ. Therefore,
(
φF
)G
= φG = φ. Suppose that φ = Pψ. Then
(
(Kψ)
F
)G
=
(
♦PψF
)G
=(
PψF
)G
= K
(
ψF
)G
= Kψ. The last equality holds because of the induction hypothesis. I leave
the other cases to the reader.
Lemma 5. For all φ ∈ LMEA, if `MEA φ, then `EA φG.
Proof. By induction on the complexity of proof in MEA. The modal axiom schemes and rules
become the trivial axiom scheme ψG → ψG and the trivial rule ψG ⇒ ψG. The modal-epistemic
axiom schemes and rules become KψG → ψG, KψG → KKψG, (KψG ∧K (ψG → θG)) → θG,
and ψG ⇒ KψG, all of which are restricted versions of axioms schemes and rules of EA. I leave
the other cases to the reader.
One can then prove the converse of Horsten’s theorem:
Theorem 2. For all φ ∈ LEA, if `MEA φF , then `EA φ.
Proof. Suppose that φ ∈ LEA and `MEA φF . Since φF belongs by definition to LMEA, it follows
by lemma 5 that `EA
(
φF
)G
. So by lemma 4, `EA φ.
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So there is a faithful and natural translation of the language of EA into the language of
MEA.
Let us briefly consider whether progress has been made by analysing the complex notion of
knowability into a modal and an epistemic component. The answer is affirmative. Lemma’s 1
and 2 are philosophically interesting. The proof of lemma 1 involves ME1, which is the Platonic
thesis that all arithmetical truths are necessary truths. However, this thesis is not strictly needed,
since ME1 is a theorem of MEA minus ME1 in its axiomatic base.
Lemma 6. `MEA− ∀x∀y (y < x→ y < x), with MEA− identical to
MEA, except that ME1 does not belong to its axiomatic base.
Proof. The proof is by the induction principle.
First, one needs to prove that:
∀y (y < 0→ y < 0)
The above is a trivial consequence of the theorem of PA that ∀y¬y < 0.
Second, one needs to prove that:
∀x (∀y (y < x→ y < x)→ ∀y (y < s (x)→ y < s (x)))
Suppose that y < s (x). By an axiom of PA, it follows that y < x ∨ x = y. It follows from the
first disjunct and ∀y (y < x→ y < x) that y < x. It follows from the second disjunct, the
axiom schemes for identity and the rule of necessitation that x = y (Hughes and Cresswell 1996,
p. 313). Therefore, it follows from the supposition that y < x ∨x = y. It is a consequence in
the modal system K that  (y < x ∨ x = y) (Hughes and Cresswell 1996, p. 31). Given the proof
principles of K, it follows from the latter and the mentioned axiom of PA that y < s (x).
Theorem 3. For all φ ∈ LPA, `MEA− ♦φ → φ, with MEA− identical to MEA, except that
ME1 does not belong to its axiomatic base.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the complexity of φ. Suppose that φ is an atomic formula.
Then φ is of the form ti = tj or of the form ti < tj . Suppose that ♦ti = tj . Then it follows
that ti = tj . See (Hughes and Cresswell 1996, p. 314). Suppose that ♦ti < tj . Lemma 6 and
reasoning analogous to the one in the previous case yields the conclusion that ti < tj .
Suppose that φ = ¬ψ. The induction hypothesis is that `T ♦ψ → ψ. This is equivalent to
`T ¬ψ → ¬♦ψ. It follows that ♦¬ψ → ♦¬♦ψ. Assume that ♦¬ψ. Then it follows that ♦¬♦ψ.
It is an easy S5-consequence that ¬♦ψ, whence it follows that ¬ψ. See (Hughes and Cresswell
1996, p. 35, 42, 58) for the relevant results from modal logic.
Suppose that φ = ψ ∧ θ. Assume that ♦φ. It follows that ♦ψ ∧ ♦θ (Hughes and Cresswell
1996, p. 35). The conclusion follows by the induction hypothesis.
Suppose that φ = ∀xψ. Assume that ♦∀xψ. The induction hypothesis is that `T ♦ψ → ψ.
It follows by universal generalisation that ∀x♦ψ → ∀xψ and it follows from the consequent by
universal instantiation that ψ. Since `T ∀xψ → ψ, it is also the case that `T ♦∀xψ → ♦ψ.
Finally, since x does not occur freely in ♦∀xψ, one can deduce `T ♦∀xψ → ∀x♦ψ.
The principle of the factivity of knowability is stronger than the principle of the factivity of
knowledge, since the first implies the second given system T, whereas the second implies the first
given system S5, and even then only in a restricted form: the factivity of knowability is restricted
to what are, in effect (see lemma 1), necessary truths. Moreover, the principle of the factivity
of knowledge is generally deemed correct,5 whereas the unrestricted version of the principle of
5See (Williamson 2000), although some disagree (Spicer 2008).
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the factivity of knowability is not. By way of informal counterexample, consider a theorem of
MEA φ. By ME4 it follows that ♦Pφ. Next, by ME3 it follows that ♦PPφ. Assume the
unrestricted version of the principle of the factivity of knowability. Then it follows that Pφ, for
any theorem of MEA. In other words, the unrestricted version of the principle entails logical
and mathematical omniscience. To be sure, this argument depends on other principles as well,
notably ME3 and ME4. The latter seems to be a correct principle, if one recalls that the
relevant notion is (informal) proof, a kind of a priori knowledge. Given that MEA is recursively
axiomatizable, one can have a proof of each of its theorems.
To conclude, not only can one in a natural and faithful way translate the language of EA to
the language of MEA, but one also gains some philosophical insight by doing so, as witnessed
by lemma’s 1 and 2 and, to a lesser extent, lemma 3.
4 Horsten’s Modal Epistemic-Arithmetic: Models
In the subsequent subsections I will discuss models for Modal-Epistemic Sentential Logic (MESL),
Modal-Epistemic First-Order Logic (MEFOL) and, finally, Modal-Epistemic Arithmetic (MEA).
Each level gives rise to problems that carry over to the higher levels (if any). By solving those
problems at the lowest level possible one can avoid unnecessary complications.
4.1 Models for Modal-Epistemic Sentential Logic
For any language that contains the language of epistemic logic it is a challenge to give an inter-
pretation that avoids making all the arithmetical truths knowable, as discussed in the previous
section. There is an additional problem for modal-epistemic languages. Suppose one uses the
standard Hintikka-Kripke models for MESL,6 i.e. quadruples 〈W,RM , RE , V 〉, with RM a bi-
nary relation on W , called the ‘modal accessibility relation’, with RE a reflexive binary relation
on W , called the ‘epistemic accessibility relation’, and with V a function from the set of sentence
letters and W to {1, 0}. The definition of truth of a formula at a world in a given model contains
among others the following two clauses:
1. M, w |= ♦ψ if and only if M, w′ |= ψ for some w′ ∈W such that wRMw′;
2. M, w |= Pψ if and only if M, w′ |= ψ for all w′ ∈W such that wREw′.
Now that the epistemic and modal component of knowability have been disentangled, one is
faced with the problem of logical omniscience, i.e. every logical truth is known at each possible
world and every logical consequence of what is known at a world is also known at that world.
(The knowability of logical truths and the logical consequences of knowable truths are part and
parcel of the modal-epistemic logical fragment of MEA. More about that later.) Moreover, if
arithmetical sentences get the same truth-value at each world, then all arithmetical truths are
known at each possible world as well.
To avoid the problems of logical (and arithmetical) omniscience one could turn to awareness
models, which are developed in (Fagin and Halpern 1988), or to impossible worlds models, which
are developed in (Rantala 1982), or to syntactical models (Fagin et al. 1995). These types of
models are defined as follows:
Definition 3. An awareness model M for LMESL is a quintuple
〈W,RM , RE , V a, A〉,
6See also the paper by Martin Fischer in this volume.
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with W a non-empty set, RM a binary relation on W , RE a binary reflexive relation on W and
V a a function from the set of n-place predicate symbols and W to ℘ (Dn) and with A, called the
‘awareness function’, a function from W to ℘ (FORM (LMESL)).
Definition 4. If M is an awareness model, w a world and φ a well-formed formula, then
M, w |= φ is defined recursively as follows:
1. if φ is a sentence letter p, then M, w |= φ if and only if V a (p) = 1;
2. the clauses for ¬, ∧ are expected;
3. if φ = ♦ψ, then M, w |= φ if and only if M, w′ |= ψ for some w′ ∈W such that wRMw′;
4. if φ = Pψ, then M, w |= φ if and only if M, w′ |= ψ for all w′ ∈W such that wREw′ and
ψ ∈ A (w).
The first conjunct of the truth-condition for formulas of the form Pψ determines the formulas
that are implicitly known at w, while the second conjunct of the same truth-condition acts as a
sieve that filters out the formulas that are also explicitly known at w.
Definition 5. An impossible worlds model for LMESL is a quintuple
〈W,W ∗, RM , RE , V i〉,
with W a non-empty set, W ∗ a set, whose elements are called ‘impossible worlds’, RM a binary
relation on W , RE a binary reflexive relation on W ∪W ∗, V i a function (i) from the set sentence
letters and W to truth-values and (ii) from FORM (LMESL) and W ∗ to {1, 0}.
The clauses of the definition of truth of a formula at a possible world in a model are standard
Definition 6. If M is an impossible worlds model, w a possible world and φ a well-formed
formula, then M, w |= φ is defined recursively as follows:
1. if φ is a sentence letter p, then M, w |= φ if and only if V a (p) = 1;
2. the clauses for ¬, ∧ are as expected;
3. if φ = ♦ψ, then M, w |= φ if and only if M, w′ |= ψ for some w′ ∈W such that wRMw′;
4. if φ = Pψ, then M, w |= φ if and only if M, w′ |= ψ for all w′ ∈ W ∪ W ∗ such that
wRMw
′.
Definition 7. If M is an impossible worlds model, w∗ an impossible world and φ a well-formed
formula, then M, w∗ |= φ if and only if V i (φ,w∗) = 1.
Validity is defined with respect to truth at possible worlds in a model.
Definition 8. A syntactical model for LMESL is a triple 〈W,RM , V s〉, with W a non-empty set,
RM a binary relation on W and with V
s a function from FORM (L (MESL)) and W to {1, 0}
such that:
1. if φ = ¬ψ, then V s (φ,w) = 1 if and only if V s (ψ,w) = 0;
2. if φ = ψ ∧ θ, V s (φ,w) = 1 if and only if V s (ψ,w) = 1 and V s (θ, w) = 1;
3. if φ = ♦ψ, then V s (φ,w) if and only if V s (ψ,w′) for some w′ ∈W such that wRMw′;
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4. if φ = Pψ, then if V s (φ,w) = 1, then V s (ψ,w) = 1.
Definition 9. M, w |= φ if and only if V s (φ,w) = 1.
One can prove point-wise equivalence results for these types of models.7 All three types of
models provide solutions for the problem of logical omniscience, as the reader can verify for
him- or herself. I will sketch the proof for a partial point-wise equivalence result. Consider any
awareness model Ma = 〈W,RM , RE , V a, A〉, world w and formula φ. Then define a syntactical
model Ms as follows: Ms = 〈W a, RaM , V s〉, with V s such that:
1. for any sentence letter p, V s (p, w) = 1 if and only if V a (p, w) = 1;
2. V s (Pψ,w) = 1 if and only if
ψ ∈ {φ | φ ∈ A (w) ∧ ∀w′ (wREw′ →M,w′ |= φ)}.
One can prove by induction on the complexity of φ that Ma, w |= φ if and only if Ms, w |= φ.
One remarkable feature of syntactical models is that they contain a truth-at-a-world-in-the-
model function, which is normally defined separately. The reason the definition of truth-at-a-
world-in-a-model is integrated in the definition of what a model is, is that one would otherwise
have two circular definitions, since the truth-values of Pψ-formulas are primitive (i.e., they are
given directly by the model), but the truth of Pψ has to imply the truth of ψ, which may not be
primitive but may be compositional in nature. This circularity is avoided in syntactical models
as defined above, but it is not always easy to construct those models, since one essentially hard
codes knowledge and thereby one has to respect the condition that what is known is true, which
is not always easy to verify. This problem does not arise for awareness models or impossible
worlds models, since the reflexivity of the RE-relation guarantees that, if M, w |= Pφ, then
M, w |= φ. If one wants to know whether there is a syntactical counter-model to an inference of
φ from a set of premises Γ, then one can use the following strategy: first, construct an awareness
model in which all of Γ are true and φ false; second, use the partial point-wise equivalence result
provided earlier to prove that there is a syntactical model that is a counter-model as well. Of
course, impossible worlds models are equally useful in this respect.
Awareness models, impossible worlds models and syntactical models can be used to solve
the problem of logical omniscience. These kinds of models bring forth a new problem, however.
This is the problem of logical incompetence. Nothing in these models guarantees that one can
come to know logical truths or that one can come to know the logical consequences of knowable
truths. In other words, any theory formulated in the language of modal-epistemic sentential logic
that includes ME4 and ME5 is unsound with respect to these models. The modal-epistemic
sentential logical fragment of MEA is such a theory. Let us call it MESL.
For soundness one has to restrict the class of awareness models to those in which RE is a
reflexive, transitive relation and in which RM is an equivalence relation (since MESL contains
S5) and in which it has the following properties:
1. for all φ, if M |= φ for all M of the subclass, then for all w ∈ W , there is a w′ ∈ W such
that wRMw
′ and M, w′ |= Pφ;
7See (Fagin et al. 1995, ch. 9, exercise 9.45) and (Sillari 2008). The first gives the result as an exercise, the
second gives proofs. Neither of them give results for awareness models and impossible worlds models for modal-
epistemic languages; their results pertain to models for epistemic languages. The first bases awareness models
and impossible worlds models on Kripke-style relational structures, as in the main text of this paper, whereas
the second bases those models on Scott-Montague-style neighbourhood structures. The first included syntactical
models in the exercise, whereas the second did not include them in his result. Nevertheless, it is easy to prove the
point-wise equivalence result for awareness models, impossible worlds models and syntactical models for sentential
modal-epistemic languages.
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2. for all φ, ψ and for all wi, wj , wk ∈W , if wiRMwj andM, wj |= P (φ→ ψ) and if wiRMwk
and M, wk |= Pφ, then there is a wl ∈W such that wiRMwl and M, wl |= Pψ.
The above conditions cannot be used to define the subclass of awareness models that validate
ME4 and ME5, since that would create the following circle: the definition of the subclass
of models makes use of the notion of truth at a world in a model of that subclass, which in
turn depends on the definition of the subclass of models. In others words, there is a circularity
problem here. In the case of syntactical models, the situation is slightly different. The following
conditions on RM are sufficient to prove the soundness of ME4 and ME5:
8
1. for all φ, if V s (φ,w) = 1 for all V s belonging to syntactical models and worlds w, then for
all w ∈W there is a w′ ∈W such that wRMw′ and V s (Pφ,w′) = 1;
2. for all φ, ψ, and wi, wj , wk ∈ W , if wiRMwj and V s (Pφ,wi) = 1 and if wiRMwk and
V s (P (φ→ ψ) , wk) = 1, then there is a wl ∈W such that wiRMwl and V s (Pψ,wl) = 1.
Since V s belongs to the definition of a syntactical model, there is, strictly speaking, no circle
here. However, a kind of holism has sneaked in: in order to know whether a syntactical model
belongs to the subclass one has to know something about all the other members of the subclass
(if any). So it will not always be a trivial affair to verify that a syntactical model satisfies the
condition.
Fortunately, one can get around these problems. The solution is due to Horsten (1993, 1994).9
Consider the following two conditions on RM in syntactical models:
1s for all φ, if `MESL φ, then for all M, for all w ∈ W , there is a w′ ∈ W such that wRMw′
and M, w′ |= Pφ;
2s for all φ, ψ and for all wi, wj , wk ∈W if wiRwj and V s (P (φ→ ψ) , wj) = 1 and if wiRMwk
and V s (Pφ,wk) = 1, then there is a wl ∈W such that wiRMwl and V s (Pψ,wl) = 1.
Corresponding conditions for awareness models are the following:
1a for all φ, if `MESL φ, then for all M, for all w ∈ W , there is a w′ ∈ W such that wRMw′
and φ ∈ A (w′);
2a for all φ, ψ and for all wi, wj , wk ∈ W if wiRMwj and wiRMwk, φ ∈ A (wj) and φ→ ψ ∈
A (wk), then there is a wl ∈ W such that wiRMwl, wjREwl, wkREwl, ψ ∈ wl and for all
w′ ∈W such that wlREw′, it holds that wjREw′ and wkREw′.
And these are the corresponding conditions for impossible worlds models:
1i for all φ, if `MESL φ, then for all M, for all w ∈ W , there is a w′ ∈ W such that wRMw′
and for all w′′ ∈W ∗, if w′REw′′, then V i (φ,w′′) = 1;
2i for all φ, ψ and for all wi, wj , wk ∈ W if wiRMwj and wiRMwk, then there is a wl ∈ W
such that wiRMwl, wiRMwl, wjREwl, wkREwl and for all w
′ ∈ W such that wlREw′,
wjREw
′ and wkREw′ and, if w′ ∈ W ∗, then if V i (φ,w′) = 1 and if V i (φ→ ψ,w′) = 1,
then V i (ψ,w′) = 1.
8Strictly speaking, theories are (un)sound under interpretations, but I will allow myself this lax terminology.
Note that I do not want to use the notions of validity or validity-preservation at this point. More about that
later.
9As we will see in subsection 4.4, Horsten used one condition rather than two, but in order to present this
material in a step-by-step way, I will use two conditions.
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Let us discuss these conditions one by one. Condition 1s on syntactical models guarantees that
ME4 is sound.10 Suppose one has used ME4 to derive ♦Pψ on line n in a proof. Then there
is a line m < n that contains ψ, which has been derived from the empty set of premises. It
follows that, for any syntactical model M and world w there is a world w′ such that wRMw′
and V s (Pψ) = 1. Therefore |= ♦Pψ.
Condition 1a ensures that ME4 is sound relative to awareness models. If one proceeds from
the same assumption as above, then for any w ∈ W , there is a w′ ∈ W such that wRMw′ and
ψ ∈ A (w′). Moreover, it follows from the induction hypothesis and `MESL ψ that M |= ψ for
all awareness models M in the subclass. Therefore, M, w′′ |= ψ for all w′ such that w′REw′′.
Together these two facts imply that M, w′ |= Pψ. Given that wRMw′, it is also the case that
M, w |= ♦Pψ. This is the case for any M (that satisfies condition 1a) and any w, so |= ♦Pψ.
Finally, condition 1i enforces that ME4 is sound. If there is a line m < n in the proof such
that `MESL ψ, then for all impossible worlds models M and w ∈ W there is a w′ ∈ W such
that wRMw
′ and for all w∗ ∈ W ∗, if w′REw∗, then V i (φ,w∗) = 1. It follows by the induction
hypothesis from `MESL ψ that |= ψ and, therefore, that for all w′′ ∈ W , if w′REw′′, then
M, w′′ |= ψ. Hence, M, w′ |= Pψ, whence it follows that M, w |= ♦Pψ and, since this holds for
any M or w, |= Pψ.
Condition 2s on syntactical models clearly does the job it is designed to do. After all, it is
nothing but the result of hard coding what one wants. Condition 2a on awareness models also
delivers what we need. For if M, wi |= ♦Pφ and M, w |= ♦P (φ→ ψ), then there is a world wj
and a world wk with wiRMwj and wiRMwk such that M, wj |= Pφ and M, wk |= P (φ→ ψ).
Therefore, φ ∈ A (wj) and φ → ψ ∈ A (wk). It then follows that there is a wl such that
wiRMwl, wjREwl, wkREwl and ψ ∈ A (wl). By the clause for P, it follows that M, wl |= φ
and M, wl |= (φ→ ψ). Consequently, M, wl |= ψ. Moreover, for all w′ ∈W such that wlREw′,
M, w′ |= ψ, sinceM, w′ |= φ (because wjREw′ andM, wj |= Pφ) andM, w′ |= φ→ ψ (because
wkREw
′ and M, wk |= P (φ→ ψ)). Therefore, M, wl |= Pψ and M, wi |= ♦Pψ. So, ME4 is
valid on all models that satisfy condition 2a.
Finally, condition 2i on impossible worlds models makes ME4 valid. Indeed, even if there is
a w′ ∈W ∗ such that wlREw′, then
V i (φ,w′) = V i (φ→ ψ,w′) = 1,
since wjREw
′ and wkREw′. So by condition 2i V i (ψ,w′) = 1.
Conditions 1s, 1a and 1i are not so easy to work with, since one needs to know in advance
whether certain formulas are provable-in-MESL from a set of premises. Fortunately, there are
sufficient, non-circular conditions that do the job as well. For instance, one can restrict the
class of awareness models as follows: for every w ∈ W , there is a w′ ∈ W such that wRMw′
and A (w) = LMESL. This condition guarantees that ME4 is truth-preserving at every world
in a model that satisfies that condition. If M |= φ for all M (in the subclass), then for any
w ∈W there is a w′ ∈W such that wRMw′ and A (w) = LMESL and, in particular, φ ∈ A (w′).
10The following is based on the proof in (Horsten 1993, ch. 4). In his proof Horsten proceeds from the assumption
that φ, which is of the form ♦Pψ, has been proved using ME4 to the conclusion that φ is true at a possible world
accessible from any given world. This is correct, but what follows is that M, w |= ♦P♦Pψ. Given ME2 and
a few modal principles, which are all assumed to be sound, it follows that M, w |= ♦Pψ, but Horsten does not
reason that way. Probably he meant to say that a line m (with m < n) contains ψ, and that ψ has been derived
from the empty set of premises. The argument given in the main text shows how to proceed from there. There is
a conceptually important point to be made here. What is proved here is soundness, but not validity-preservation.
From the assumption that Γ ` φ has been derived on the basis of ME4, it is inferred that φ is of the form ♦Pψ
for some ψ and that on a line m (with m < n) one has ψ, which has been derived from the empty set of premises.
It follows that Γ |= ♦Pφ. What has not been proved is that, if |= ψ, then |= ♦Pψ. To prove this, one needs to
prove the completeness theorem first.
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Moreover, if M |= φ for all M (in the subclass), then M, w′′ |= φ for all w′ such that w′REw′′.
Together these two facts imply that M, w′ |= Pφ. Given that wRMw′, it is also the case that
M, w |= ♦Pφ. So there is a sufficient, non-circular condition. It is not a necessary condition,
however. The effect of letting the awareness set of a possible world be the entire language is that
the awareness set does no longer function as a sieve. But the holes of the sieve have been made
wider than is strictly speaking necessary. Note that {φ |`MESL φ} ⊂ LMESL. Similarly, the class
of impossible world models can be restricted as follows so as to make ME4 truth-preserving:
for every w ∈ W , there is a w′ ∈ W such that wRMw′ and, for every w′′ such that w′REw′′,
w′′ ∈ W . The former is a sufficient, non-circular condition. (I leave the proof to the reader.) It
is again not a necessary condition, however.
To conclude, there are subclasses of awareness models, impossible worlds models and syn-
tactical models of modal-epistemic sentential languages that do not succumb to the problems of
logical omniscience and logical incompetence.
4.2 Models for Modal-Epistemic First-Order Logic
So far I have only considered models for modal-epistemic sentential logic. I have not provided
definitions of awareness models, impossible world models or syntactical models for first-order
languages. In order not to complicate things from the start I will focus on first-order logic
without the identity symbol, individual constants and function symbols.
Recall that the satisfaction clause for formulas φ of the form ∀xψ is the following: if φ is of
the form ∀xψ, then M, w, a |= ∀xψ if and only if M, w, a′ |= ψ for all a′ ∼x a.11 Sillari (2008)
studied awareness models and impossible worlds models for first-order languages. He used the
satisfaction clause above. There is a problem that he failed to notice. Suppose that φ is of the
form ∃xPψ (x). Then M, w, a |= φ only if for some x-variant a′ of a, M, w′, a′ |= ψ (x) for all
wRw′ and ψ (x) ∈ A (w). There is a problem, however, namely that the Principle of Replacement
(PR) fails.12 As a reminder, here are two definitions and a statement of the principle:
Definition 10. For any variables x, y, z and variable assignment function a, a[x 7→ a (y)] is a
function such that:
1. if z 6= x, then a[x 7→ a (y)] (z) = a (z);
2. if z = x, then a[x 7→ a (y)] (z) = a (y).
Definition 11. For any well-formed formula φ, variables x, y, φ (y/x) is identical to φ except
that all free occurrences of x (if any) are uniformly replaced by free occurrences of y.
Theorem 4 (Principle of Replacement). For any well-formed formula φ, variables x and y
and for any model M for a first-order language and variable assignment function a, M, a[x 7→
a (y)] |= φ if and only if M, a |= φ (y/x). (Hughes and Cresswell 1996, p. 241, 242)
Corollary 2. For any model M for a first-order language and variable assignment function a,
if M, a |= ∀xφ, then M, a |= φ (y/x).13
11Rantala (1982, p. 47) opted for substitutional quantification rather than objectual quantification. The problem
of quantifying in as described in this article does not arise for impossible worlds models with substitutional
quantification. Since objectual quantification is the standard form of quantification, I will explore what happens
if one combines (semi-)syntactical models with objectual quantification.
12There is a variation on awareness models that avoids the problem described above. Awareness models of the
kind defined above are sometimes referred to as general awareness models. Another variety are local awareness
models. In (Sillari 2008) one can find a definition of local awareness models for first-order epistemic logic. PR
holds in these models. The problem, however, is that it does not work for general awareness models. For it would
lead to the unwelcome result that if one knows a truth about certain objects, then one knows all the truths about
those objects.
13The crucial step of the proof is that a[x 7→ a (y)] ∼x a.
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But there is nothing built into awareness models and impossible worlds that forces those
models to make PR true. For instance, it can happen that in an awareness model M and at a
world w for an assignment a thatM, w, a[x 7→ a (y)] |= φ butM, w, a 6|= φ (y/x). Let φ be PPx,
W = {w}, R = {〈w,w〉}, D = {d}, V a (P,w) = d, A (w) = {Px} and let a (x) = a (y) = d.
Then M, w, a[x 7→ a (y)] |= PPx and M, w, a 6|= PPy, since Py 6∈ A (w). Note that it is also
true that M, w, a |= ∀xPPx, so universal instantiation fails as well. Similarly, let φ be PPx,
M an impossible worlds model, with W = {w}, W ∗ = {w∗}, R = {〈w,w〉, 〈w∗, w∗〉, 〈w,w∗〉},
D = {d}, V i (P,w) = d, V i (Px,w∗) = 1, V i (Px,w∗) = 1 and let a (x) = a (y) = d. Given
that M, w∗, a′ |= φ if and only if V i (φ,w) = 1, it follows that M, w, a[x 7→ a (y)] |= PPx but
M, w, a 6|= PPy. Note that it is also true thatM, w, a |= ∀xPPx, so universal instantiation fails
as well. An example involving syntactical models will be given below.
There is an easy solution to the problem, but I think it is unsatisfactory. One might reason as
follows: any theorem of MEFOL has to be known at some world w′ which is modally accessible
from a given world w;  (∀xφ→ φ (y/x)) is a theorem of MEFOL; so it is knowable at w′; if a
formula is known at w′, then it is true at w′; consequently, ∀xφ→ φ (y/x) is true at every world
w′′ that is modally accessible from w′; RM is a symmetrical relation; therefore ∀xφ → φ (y/x)
is true at w as well; the choice of w was arbitrary, so ∀xφ→ φ (y/x) is true at any world. This
solution is all right as far as it goes, but it does not help with awareness models, impossible world
models or syntactical models in which RM does not have the very particular set of properties
the above argument depends on. It would be better to have a solution that works for those three
types of (semi-)syntactical models in general.
A solution that works for impossible worlds models, awareness models and syntactical models
alike consists making A, V i and V s relative to assignment functions a. Subsequently, one can
hard code PR in those (semi-)syntactical elements. The following definitions spell this out.
Definition 12. An awareness model Ma for LMEFOL is a tuple
〈W,RM , RE , D, V a, S,A〉,
with W , RM , RE as in definition 3, with D a non-empty set, V
a a function from the set of n-
place predicate symbols and W to ℘ (Dn), with S the set of functions from variables to elements
of D, and A a function from W and S to ℘ (FORM (LMEFOL)) such that for any variables x, y,
assignments a, worlds w and formulas φ, φ (y/x) ∈ A (w, a) if and only if φ ∈ A (w, a[x 7→ a (y)]).
Definition 13. If M is an awareness model, w a world, a an assignment function and φ a
well-formed formula, then M, w, a |= φ is defined recursively as follows:
1. if φ is of the form P (x1, . . . , xn) (with P an n-place predicate symbol), then M, w, a |= φ
if and only if 〈a (x1) , . . . , a (xn)〉 ∈ V a (R,w);
2. the clauses for ¬, ∧ are as expected;
3. if φ = ♦ψ, then M, w, a |= φ if and only if M, w′, a |= ψ for some w′ ∈ W such that
wRMw
′;
4. if φ = Pψ, then M, w, a |= φ if and only if M, w′, a |= ψ for all w′ ∈W such that wREw′
and ψ ∈ A (w, a);
5. if φ = ∀xψ, then M, w, a |= φ if and only if M, w, a′ |= φ for all a′ ∼x a.
Definition 14. An impossible worlds modelMi for LMEFOL is a septuple 〈W,W ∗, RM , RE , D, S, V i〉,
with W , W ∗, RM , RE as in definition 5, with D a non-empty set, with S the set of functions
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from D to the set of variables, and with V i a function from (i) the set of n-place predicate letters
and W to ℘ (Dn) and (ii) from FORM (LMEFOL) and W ∗ and S to {1, 0} such that for any
variables x, y, assignments a, worlds w and formulas φ, V i (φ (y/x) , w∗, a) = 1 if and only if
V i (φ,w∗, a[x 7→ a (y)]) = 1.
Definition 15. If M is an impossible worlds model, w a possible world, a an assignment and φ
a well-formed formula, then M, w, a |= φ is defined recursively as follows:
1. if φ is of the form P (x1, . . . , xn) (with P an n-place predicate symbol), then M, w, a |= φ
if and only if 〈a (x1) , . . . , a (xn)〉 ∈ V i (R,w);
2. the clauses for ¬, ∧ are as expected;
3. if φ = ♦ψ, then M, w, a |= φ if and only if M, w′, a |= ψ for some w′ ∈ W such that
wRMw
′;
4. if φ = Pψ, then M, w, a |= φ if and only if M, w′, a |= ψ for all w′ ∈ W ∪W ∗ such that
wRMw
′;
5. if φ = ∀xψ, then M, w, a |= φ if and only if M, w, a′ |= φ for all a′ ∼x a.
Definition 16. If M is an impossible worlds model, w∗ an impossible world, a an assignment
and φ a well-formed formula, then M, w∗, a |= φ if and only if V i (φ,w∗, a) = 1.
Definition 17. A syntactical model for LMEFOL is a quintuple
〈W,RM , D, S, V s〉,
with W a non-empty set, RM a binary relation on W , S the set of functions from D to the set
of variables, and with V s a function (i) from the set of n-place predicate letters and W to ℘ (Ds)
and (ii) from FORM (LMEFOL), W and S to {1, 0} such that:
1. if φ is of the form P (x1, . . . , xn) (with P an n-place predicate symbol), then V
s (φ) = 1 if
and only if 〈a (x1) , . . . , a (xn)〉 ∈ V s (P,w);
2. if φ = ¬ψ, then V s (φ,w, a) = 1 if and only if V s (ψ,w, a) = 0;
3. if φ = ψ ∧ θ, then V s (φ,w, a) = 1 if and only if V s (ψ,w, a) = 1 and V s (θ, w, a) = 1;
4. if φ = ♦ψ, then V s (φ,w, a) if and only if V s (ψ,w′, a) for some w′ ∈W such that wRw′;
5. if φ = Pψ, then if V s (φ,w, a) = 1, then V s (ψ,w, a) = 1
6. if φ = ∀xψ, then V s (φ,w, a) = 1 if and only if V s (ψ,w, a′) = 1 for all a′ ∼x a;
7. for any variables x, y, assignments a, worlds w and formulas ψ,
V s (Pψ (y/x) , w, a) = 1
if and only if
V s (Pψ,w, a[x 7→ a (y)]) = 1.
Given the above definitions, it is easy to prove the following:
Theorem 5. For any well-formed formula φ, variables x and y, and for any awareness model,
impossible worlds model or syntactical modelM for a first-order modal-epistemic language, world
w and variable assignment function a, M, w, a |= φ (y/x) if and only if M, w, a[x 7→ a (y)] |= φ.
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The problem identified at the beginning of this subsection has been solved. Given Theorem
5 one can prove that the axiom scheme of Universal Instantiation is valid for any of the three
types of models as defined in 12-17:
UI ∀xφ→ φ (y/x)
It can easily be checked that Universal Generalisation is validity-preserving.
UG If Γ ` φ (x) and x does not occur in Γ, then Γ ` ∀xφ (x)
If one adds UI and UG to MESL, then one obtains Modal-Epistemic First-Order Logic or
MEFOL. In order to prove the relevant soundness theorems, one has to impose conditions on
RM , as discussed in subsection 4.1.
In this subsection the problem of quantifying in that poses itself for awareness models, im-
possible worlds models and syntactical models for MEFOL has been discussed. MEFOL is
Modal-Epistemic First-Order Logic without identity, individual constants or function symbols.
In the next subsection I will briefly discuss models for modal-epistemic languages with identity
and terms other than variables.
4.3 Identity and terms
The language LMEFOL= is the extension of LMEFOL with the identity symbol, individual con-
stants and function symbols. Now the question arises how to interpret those new symbols. For
present purposes it will do to opt for the standard interpretation given in (Hughes and Cresswell
1996, p. 327-328). V is no longer only a function from the set of n-place predicate symbols and
W to ℘ (Dn) but also from the set of individual constants to D and from the set of n-place
function symbols to the set of functions from Dn to D. Next, one can define the denotation of
a term t given a model M and an assignment a:
Definition 18. Given a model M, variable assignment function a and term t, the denotation
of a term denM,a (t) is defined inductively as follows:
1. if t is an individual constant c, then denM,a (t) = V (c);
2. if t is an individual variable x, then denM,a (t) = a (x);
3. if t is of the form f (t1, . . . , tn) with f a n-place function symbol and t1, . . . , tn terms, then
denM,a (t) = V (f) (denM,a (t1) , . . . , denM,a (tn)).
Subsequently, one has to modify the definitions of satisfaction of a formula at a world in
a model. The clause for atomic formulas now reads as follows: if φ is a formula of the form
P (t1, . . . , tn), then M, w, a |= φ if and only if 〈denM,a (t1) , . . . , denM,a (tn)〉 ∈ V (P,w) and, if
φ is of the form t1 = t2, then M, w, a |= φ if and only if denM,a (t1) = denM,a (t2).
The first-order logic with identity and complex terms that is contained in MEA, call it
MEFOL=, is the extension of MEFOL with the following axiom schemes:
UIt ∀xφ→ φ (t/x) (if t is substitutable for x in φ)
SI x = x
SUBS x = y → (φ→ φ′), with φ′ identical to φ except perhaps that φ′ has y free in zero or
more places where φ has free x
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The latter axiom scheme replaces UI, which is deducible from it. It is easy to verify that SI is
valid, but UIt and SUBS are not.
One can make UIt and SUBS valid in awareness models by stipulating that, for any formula
φ, variable x, term t, world w and assignment a, φ ∈ A (w, a[x 7→ denM,a (t)]) if and only if
φ′ ∈ A (w, a) with φ′ identical to φ except perhaps that φ has t in zero or more places where φ
has x (if t is substitutable for x in φ). Note that φ (t/x) is a special case: all occurrences of x
in φ have been replaced by t. Also, if a (x) = a (y), then a = a[x 7→ a (y)]. So, if φ ∈ A (w, a),
then φ′ ∈ A (w, a). Similarly, to make UIt and SUBS valid in impossible worlds models, one
can stipulate that, for any formula φ, variable x, term t, assignment a and for any w∗ ∈ W ,
V i (φ,w∗, a[x 7→ denM,a (t)]) = 1 if and only if V i (φ′, w∗, a) = 1. Finally, in order to obtain the
same goal for syntactical models, one can stipulate that for any formula φ, variable x, term t,
world w and assignment a, V s (φ,w, a[x 7→ denM,a (t)]) = 1 if and only if V s (φ′, w, a) = 1.
4.4 Models for Modal-Epistemic Arithmetic
So far the focus has been on models for the logical fragments of MEA. Let us have a look at
models for MEA itself. First one needs to consider standard models of PA. Let N = 〈ω, T 〉
be the standard interpretation of LPA, with ω the standard set of natural numbers and with
T giving the standard interpretation of the arithmetical vocabulary. Here is the definition of
Horsten models for the language of MEA:
Definition 19 (Horsten Models for MEA). A model of LMEA of is an ordered triple 〈W,RM , I〉,
with:
1. W a set of sets of sentences of LMEA such that:
(a) for all w ∈W and for every sentence φ ∈ LMEA, if φ ∈ w, then Pφ ∈ w;
(b) for all w ∈W and for every sentence φ ∈ LMEA, if φ ∈ w, then M, w |= φ;
2. RM a reflexive, symmetrical, transitive binary relation on W such that for any wi, wj,
wk ∈ W , if wiRMwj and wiRMwk, then there is a wl ∈ W such that wiRMwl and
{φ|wj ∪ wk `MEA φ} ⊆ wl;
3. I is a function (i) that maps each constant c and function symbol f of LMEA and W to
T (c) and T (f) respectively and (ii) from FORM (LMEA) and W to {1, 0} such that:
(a) if φ = P (t1, . . . , tn), then I (w, φ) = 1 if and only if
〈I (w, t1) , . . . , I (w, t1)〉 ∈ I (w,P ) ;
(b) if φ = ψ → θ, then I (w, φ) = 1 if and only if I (w,ψ) = 0 or I (w, θ) = 1;
(c) if φ = ¬ψ, then I (w, φ) = 1 if and only if I (w,ψ) = 0;
(d) if φ = ∃xψ (x); then I (w, φ) = 1 if and only if
I[a/x] (w,ψ (x)) = 1
for some a ∈ ω (with I[a/x] identical to I with the possible exception that it assigns
the number a to x);14
(e) if φ = Pψ, then I (w, φ) = 1 if and only if ψ ∈ w;
14It is curious that that Horsten talks of interpretations assigning numbers to variables. It might be that he
means one of the two following things. First, it could be that he meant to relativise the interpretation functions
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(f) if φ = ♦ψ, then I (w, φ) = 1 if and only if I (w′, ψ) = 1 for some w′ ∈ W such that
wRMw
′.
I will discuss the above definition in three stages. First, I will comment on what the above
definition implies for MESL. Then I will proceed to what it implies for MEFOL. Finally, I will
have a look at the arithmetical fragment.
One thing about the above definition that stands out is that I, which is an element of a
Horsten model, has the same role as a truth-at-a-world-in-a-model function. In other words, I is
very much like the V s function of syntactical models. It follows from the clause for P-sentences
and the conditions on W that, if I (w,Pψ) = 1, then I (w,ψ) = 1. This is basically the clause
for P-formulas in syntactical models. In order to avoid the circularity between the definitions
of what a model is and what truth-at-a-world-in-a-model, one puts a truth function for complex
formulas in the definition of a model itself.
The difference between syntactical models and Horsten models consists in the fact that in the
latter the truth of Pψ-sentences at a world w depends on whether ψ ∈ w, whereas there is no
such dependence in syntactical models. However, the distinctive feature of Horsten models gives
rise to a difficulty with respect to the canonical model proof of completeness. In the latter one
takes the worlds w to be maximally consistent sets of formulas. MESL-theorems are elements of
every maximally MESL-consistent set. If one went along Horsten’s lines, then the result would
be that for all models M, worlds w and MESL-theorems φ, M, w |= Pφ, since M, w |= Pφ if
and only if φ ∈ w. We would be back to the problem of logical omniscience. Horsten recognizes
this difficulty. His solution consists in making a detour via another type of models, in which W is
a set of ordered pairs of worlds (Horsten 1993, p. 97-98). I will not provide the details. An easier
solution is to explicitly redefine his models as syntactical models, because the truth condition
for formulas of the form Pφ is not a bi-conditional but a conditional: if V ∗ (Pφ,w) = 1, then
V ∗ (φ,w) = 1. So, even if one has V ∗ (φ,w) = 1 if and only if φ ∈ w, one cannot deduce from
the latter that V ∗ (Pφ,w) = 1.
So not only are Horsten models a variation on syntactical models, they are best reformulated
as syntactical models. They share with the latter the property of logical non-omniscience, since
the set of formulas that are elements of a given world can be a proper subset of the language.
So if φ is a theorem of MEA and if w ∈W , one can stipulate that φ /∈ w, thereby guaranteeing
that M, w |= ¬Pφ. Logical competence is guaranteed by the condition on RM .
So much for Horsten models for the language of MESL. A noteworthy property of Horsten
models for the language of MEFOL is that the worlds are sets of sentences. One might wonder
why Horsten opted to restrict the extension of W this way. Why did he choose to restrict the
elements of W to sets of closed formulas rather than formulas, whether they be open or closed?
A clue may be found in the informal description of the models in (Horsten 1994, p. 87):
Consider an arbitrary mathematician who is occupied solely with proving sentences of
LMEA. A possible world of a model can be thought of as a possible situation in which this
mathematician has a particular (possibly empty, possibly infinite) collection of statements
of LMEA of which she has a demonstration.
No limitations are imposed on the means which our mathematician has at her disposal
for proving such sentences. She may in some possible situation have a higher-order demon-
stration of the ontic sentence of LMEA which expresses the consistency of MEA. She may
to variable assignments, as is usually done and was done in subsection 4.2, but that he suppressed the variable
assignments in the clauses in which he did not really need them. Second, it could be that he meant to define
satisfaction along the lines of (Boolos, Burgess, and Jeffrey 2003, p. 117), namely an object satisfies an open
formula ‘if we considered the extended language L ∪ {c} obtained by adding a new constant c [. . . ] to our given
language L, and if among all the extensions of our given interpretation M to an interpretation of this extended
language we considered the oneMcm that assigns c the denotation m, then F (c) would be true’. Neither of these
options seems to be a good reading of what is in (Horsten 1994).
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in some possible situation “intuitively” see that a statement which is independent of Peano
arithmetic expresses an irreducible truth of arithmetic.
On the one hand, the elements of w include, among other things, formulas that can be proved in
PA, extensions of PA or via higher mathematics. Whichever is the case, a formula is provable
in an axiomatic theory if and only if its universal closure is provable and the universal closure of
a formula is a sentence. Therefore one might want to restrict provable formulas to sentences. On
the other hand, it is less clear whether one intuits only the truth of sentences or one can intuit
that a property is true of an object as well.15
Whatever the reason that one has to define W as a set of sentences rather than formulas, the
effect is that one has to deal again with the problem of quantifying in. Consider the MEFOL-
theorem ∃x♦P (P (x) ∨ ¬P (x)). The latter is true, i.e. I (w,∃x♦P (P (x) ∨ ¬P (x))) = 1 if and
only if
I[a/x] (w,♦P (P (x) ∨ ¬P (x))) = 1
for some a ∈ ω. The latter condition is fulfilled if and only if
I[a/x] (w
′,P (P (x) ∨ ¬P (x))) = 1
for some a ∈ ω and for some w′ ∈ W such that wRw′. This, in turn, is true if and only if
P (x)∨¬P (x) ∈ w′. ButW was defined as a set of sets of sentences. Therefore P (x)∨¬P (x) /∈ w′
and, hence, I (w,∃xP (P (x) ∨ ¬P (x))) = 0. So, contrary to what Horsten thinks, the first-order
logical fragment of MEA is not sound under his interpretation due to the fact that only sentences
can be known. If, on the other hand, one would allow not only sentences or closed formulas to
be knowable but open formulas as well,16 then one would be confronted with the problem with
respect to quantifying in that we encountered in the previous subsection, viz. the problem that
PR and UI fail.
The situation is even worse than that. Recall that, if R is a symmetrical relation and is such
that, if `MEA φ, then for every w ∈ W , there is a w′ ∈ W such that wRw′ and φ ∈ w, then
∀xPψ (x)→ Pψ (y/x) is true at every world. The antecedent conditions are satisfied in Horsten
models, but at the same time the consequent cannot be true at any world. So the description of
Horsten models is, in fact, incoherent. Fortunately, there is a solution to this problem, viz. the
solution described in subsections 4.2 and 4.3. As it is best to view Horsten’s models as syntactical
models, one can import the solution for these models here.17
There is one more remark about Horsten models that is worth mentioning, namely that it is
interesting to note that all of the Horsten models for MEA are standard models of arithmetic.
The quantifiers range only over standard numbers and the arithmetical vocabulary is about
the standard numbers. So Shapiro’s worry does not apply. In section 2.2, it was explained
that the challenge of finding models of the language of EA consists in finding models that
15In (Leitgeb 2009) the latter option is defended.
16In (Horsten 1993, p. 99, 100) the knowledge sets in fact can contain open formulas. When in the process of
constructing a canonical model M′ Horsten defines P− (Γ) as ‘the set consisting precisely of every formula A
for which PA is in Γ’, and goes on to stipulate that ‘[f]or each 〈wi, w′i〉 ∈ W ′ : w
′
i = P
− (wi)’. There is no
restriction to sentences anymore. Here wi is a maximally MEFOL-consistent set of formulas of LMEFOL that is
also ω-consistent. The satisfaction condition for formulas of the form PA is the following: M′, 〈wi, w′i〉 |= PA if
and only if A ∈ w′i . This does not cohere very well with the definition of Horsten models nor with the definition
variation on Horsten models in which the elements of W are ordered pairs.
17One might think that, if one understands Horsten models along the lines of (Boolos, Burgess, and Jeffrey
2003, p. 117), then there is no problem of quantifying in, since the satisfaction of open formulas is defined in terms
of the truth of sentences. The problem is that these sentences belong to an extension of LMEA and, therefore,
none of these sentences belongs to a world in the model, since worlds contain, by definition, only sentences of
LMEA.
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allow the arithmetical vocabulary to be interpreted in the standard way without ending up
with arithmetical omniscience. In other words, the problem was to show that there are some
models of that kind. But now we have ended up with only models of that kind. This has
undesirable consequences. Let us consider only the arithmetical fragment of the language and
restrict the models accordingly. On the one hand, with Horsten models it is a consequence of
{φ (t) | t ∈ LPA ∧ φ ∈ LPA} that ∀xφ (x), since every a ∈ ω is the denotation of a Peano term.
On the other hand, ∀xφ (x) is not deducible from {φ (t) | t ∈ LPA ∧ φ ∈ LPA}, since it is not
deducible from any finite subset of it. To avoid this mismatch between logical consequence and
deducibility, it is best to make the notion of Horsten models more liberal and allow models with
non-standard numbers in their domain as well.
To conclude, Horsten’s models for MEA are of the syntactical variety. They do not fall
prey to the problem of logical omniscience nor to the problem of logical competence. It does
face the problem of quantifying in, but we have seen how one that problem can be solved.
Finally, Horsten’s models show that one can assign a standard interpretation to the arithmetical
vocabulary without trivializing the models, but it is wrong to allow only models based on the
standard interpretation of arithmetic.
5 Conclusion
Even though this article focussed on Modal-Epistemic Arithmetic, I have touched on a number of
issues that are of wider interest. The problem of logical omniscience is well-known and subject of
much research. The topic of logical competence has, to the best of my knowledge, not yet gained
equal standing. The two problems are intimately related: on the one hand, one does not want
epistemic agents that know all logical truths and all logical consequences of truths they already
know; on the other hand, one does want epistemic agents to have the ability to know logical
truths and logical consequences of what they already know. The problem of quantifying in has
been ignored by some, partly because much research focuses on sentential logic, and has been
missed entirely by others. Starting from existing solutions to the problem of logical competence,
I have tried to give solutions to the problems of logical competence and quantifying in.
Of course, this article was also about Modal-Epistemic Arithmetic. Horsten proved that
Epistemic Arithmetic is interpretable in Modal-Epistemic Arithmetic: there is a translation of
the language of Epistemic Arithmetic into the language of Modal-Epistemic Arithmetic such that
the latter theory proves the translation of every theorem of the former theory. One contribution
of this article consists in a proof that, if Modal-Epistemic Arithmetic proves the translation
of a formula of the language of Epistemic Arithmetic, then that formula itself is a theorem
of Epistemic Arithmetic. Horsten (1994, p. 287) argues that, by going from a purely epistemic
framework to a modal-epistemic framework, one could find a justification of at least one principle,
namely the factivity of knowability, because a restricted version of that principle follows from
the simpler epistemic principle of the factivity of knowledge, modal principles and the Platonic
thesis that all arithmetical truths are necessary. I showed that the Platonic thesis is not required
as an axiom schema, since it can be proved in Modal-Epistemic Arithmetic without the thesis in
its axiomatic base.
Moving from proofs to models, I argued that Horsten’s models are a variation on syntactical
models. Logical and arithmetical omniscience do not constitute problems for this kind of models.
Moreover, Horsten defined his models in such a way that logical competence is ensured. But
as a kind of syntactical models, Horsten’s models inherit the problem of quantifying in. The
important challenge Horsten took up was a challenge by Shapiro: find models for Epistemic
Arithmetic that assign the standard interpretations to the arithmetical vocabulary but that are
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not trivial. I have argued that Horsten may have taken this challenge a bit too seriously by
allowing only standard models.18
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